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Abstract 
This study investigates the role of princelings in Chinese listed firms. Our findings 
suggest that princelings ensure better access to bank loans for non-SOEs but bring no 
significant benefits to SOEs. Our empirical results further indicate that bank lending 
decisions are distorted for princeling-backed firms due to the privileges and 
protections they can obtain from the higher levels of the government through 
princelings’ family ties. Moreover, we find that, due to excess long-term bank loans, 
princeling-backed non-SOEs tend to overinvest, which ultimately results in lower 
investment efficiency. Furthermore, we use the difference-in-difference method to 
capture the effect of the exogenous shock of the recent anticorruption campaign in 
China on princelings and corporate finance and investment. We demonstrate that the 
anti-corruption campaign launched by the Chinese government in 2012 effectively 
weakened the power of princeling connections. Overall, our study suggests that by 
distorting bank lending decisions and encouraging overinvestment, the involvement of 
princelings in firms causes resource misallocation which favours princeling-backed 
firms and discourages investment in non-princeling-backed firms. 
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1. Introduction 
   Social networks have always been an essential component of human societies. 
When it comes to the field of corporate finance, we are interested in the influence of 
such relationships on corporate operations. The extant literature has identified several 
types of networks that have impacts on individual firms, including alumni connections, 
professional connections, social connections (local ties), legal and business 
connections, and political connections in diverse forms (Maciel and Camargo, 2016; 
Mogiliansky, 2001)1. Among others, political connections play a non-negligible role 
in firms in both developed and developing economies. In developed economies like 
the United States, lobbying activities are a typical form of political connections at the 
firm level (Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2006; Drazen el al., 2007). In emerging 
countries like China, political connections usually exist through executives having 
prior experience working for the government. This form of political connections, 
which are referred to as normal political connections in this paper, has been 
thoroughly investigated in the literature. 
In addition to the aforementioned normal political connections, there are 
“princelings connections” that are even more powerful in the Chinese market. This 
“princelings connections” are proposed as a new form of political connections in this 
paper. A firm with princeling shareholders or executives is considered to possess 
princeling connections. The term “princelings” refers to descendants of former senior 
bureaucrats of the Chinese Communist Party. They have aroused a heated discussion 
due to their significant influence on the economy in China, but their impacts have 
rarely been investigated in an academic manner. As a result of the continuous rule of 
Chinese Communist Party since the establishment of the nation, successive senior 
bureaucrats possess great political power, even long after their retirements, and that 
power is inherited by princelings to some extent. The New York Times published an 
article in May 2012, entitled “‘Princelings’ in China Use Family Ties to Gain Riches”. 
The article declared that princelings were almost routinely included in commercial 
ventures in today’s China. According to the article, “this is how the Communist Party 
shares the spoils, allowing the relatives of senior leaders to cash in”. For instance, Li 
Xiaolin (daughter of Li Peng, a former prime minister) is the chairwoman and chief 
                                                 
1  For instance, alumni connections affect stock holding decisions and returns of fund portfolio 
managers (Cohen and Malloy, 2010), while professional connections help firms to get more trading 
credit (Liu et al., 2016). 
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executive of China Power International, one of the five biggest power generating 
companies in China. Her brother, Li Xiaopeng, was formerly the head of another top 
electricity company and is now a provincial governor. Over the past two decades, 
business and politics have become so tightly intertwined that the Communist Party 
has effectively institutionalized an entire ecosystem of crony capitalism (Barboza and 
Franiere, 2012). 
Princelings do play a big part in the crony system. They are extremely powerful 
in China because even though laws and regulations prevent senior bureaucrats from 
misusing their authority, there are still loopholes for their families to take advantage 
of. To be more specific, incumbent bureaucrats are legally barred from taking any 
positions in firms and their spouses and children are not allowed to be engaged in any 
business under the bureaucrats’ jurisdiction while they are in power. If incumbent 
bureaucrats or their family members are caught obtaining personal benefits, they 
suffer harsh punishments according to the law. In consideration of possible future 
political careers, and more importantly to be free from having criminal records, 
incumbent bureaucrats are normally very cautious when they are in power. Therefore, 
if they intend to obtain personal benefits from their positions, their only choice is to 
cooperate with their former colleagues and, more commonly, with subordinate 
officials after their retirement. However, there are strict regulations which prevent 
former bureaucrats form participating in business activities connected to their former 
jurisdiction even after their retirement. This means that it is not possible for them to 
gain benefits directly for themselves. As a result, the descendants of former senior 
bureaucrats, princelings, are found to be perfect proxies for the elder generation.  
Princelings act as representatives of their political families and obtain benefits by 
utilizing the political networks previously constructed by older family members. Due 
to their family connections they are able to bribe corrupt bureaucrats in their networks 
in exchange of privileges and protections for their firms. This motivates princelings to 
take managerial positions in firms, or simply to establish their own firms. 
Participating in business activities enables princelings to use their political influence 
into obtain actual benefits for their firms, as well as for themselves if going a step 
further, juris et de jure. The other way around, against the institutional background of 
severe government intervention and relatively weak legal protection for property 
rights, Chinese firms, especially private enterprises, are subject to strong incentives to 
establish princelings connections so that they can enjoy privileges and protections 
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from the government (Burkart et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2005; Yeh et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, the benefits gained by princeling-backed firms are at the cost of non-
princeling-backed firms. As discussed above, since China is an emerging economy in 
transformation, its financial market is not entirely market-oriented. The government 
still possesses great controlling power over banks, especially state-owned banks. 
Therefore, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are in a favourable position for obtaining 
loans from banks due to their inherited connections to the government. This means 
fewer loans are available for non-SOEs. Thus, princeling connections are highly 
sought after by non-SOEs. Since SOEs and princeling-backed non-SOEs are able to 
claim larger shares of the limited capital resources, non-princeling-backed non-SOEs 
are faced with as even harsher financing environment, and this creates an unbalanced 
and unhealthy economic environment. To target party and government officials 
suspected of corruption, the Chinese government launched a major anti-corruption 
campaign at the end of 2012.  
Princeling connections, as a complement to normal political connections, are the 
key subject investigated in this study. The two types of political connections co-exist. 
On the one hand, the widespread normal political connections are usually identified 
when firms employ executives with governmental working experience. On the other 
hand, princeling connections are welcomed by firms as well. The extant literature 
contains mixed, even conflicting, views on the influence of political connections 
(Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007). The reason 
for this may be the hidden role of princeling connections. As normal political 
connections have been relatively broadly established in firms, princeling connections 
appear to have more influence on competition for resources and loans. 
It is true that princeling connections are, to some extent, similar to normal 
political connections that they both utilize their connections to the government in 
exchange for personal benefits and help firms to take an advantageous position in the 
market. Nevertheless, princeling connections are distinguished from normal political 
connection in the mechanism through which they have impacts on corporate 
operations. On the one hand, normal political connections refer to executives who 
have previous working experience in the government. Upon its definition, it is 
obvious that “experience” of normal political connections is what valued most by 
firms. Based on their experience, executives of normal political connections are 
familiar with how government works, for instance the operation of government 
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departments or the approval procedure of license or projects (Ferris et al., 2019; Hung 
et al., 2015). Such experience helps executives to better cooperate with the 
government in order to achieve their firms’ aim. In other words, executives with 
normal political connections know how to do things in the government’s way to win a 
favourable place. On the other hand, princelings handle this in another way. The 
reason they are called princelings is their “family ties”, and that is their biggest 
difference from normal political connections. Counting on their fathers or mothers 
who used to be senior or even top bureaucrats, princelings utilize their family ties to 
reach out to the incumbent bureaucrats who were their fathers’ or mothers’ former 
colleagues or subordinate officials (Chen and Kung, 2019). With their inherited 
political power, princelings know how to get things done through their ties. Moreover, 
their networks that cover the government enable them to obtain insider information, 
which is a real advantage compared to non-princeling-backed firms. To sum up, 
impacts of princeling connections are released in a way that is more direct and 
powerful. Since princeling connections are superior to normal political connections, 
we would expect their significant impacts in addition to normal political connections 
when they co-exist in firms. 
    The impacts of princeling connections are examined from four perspectives: (1) 
impacts on the level of access to bank loans in individual firms; (2) impacts on bank 
lending decisions; (3) impacts on corporate investment decisions; (4) the influence of 
the anti-corruption campaign on the role of princeling connections. Firstly, since 
many studies have shown that normal political connections do have great positive 
impacts on corporate financing, we hypothesise that princeling connections have 
unique effects in addition to these normal political connections. This hypothesis can 
also be inferred from the institutional background mentioned above. Secondly, we 
hypothesise that princeling connections have significant impacts on bank lending 
decisions because firms with government support are always considered to be better 
debtors by banks. Thirdly, if princeling-backed firms are supposed to get more bank 
loans, it is reasonable to assume that the excess capital is transferred into investment 
expenditure, and that this affects investment efficiency. Finally, to justify the 
fundamental fact that the benefits brought by princeling connections depend on 
bribery and corruption, a comparison between the empirical results before and after 
the anti-corruption campaign is made. 
The results of our regression models, consistent with our hypotheses, suggest 
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that princeling connections do have major impacts on multiple aspects of corporate 
operations. First of all, princeling connections generally improve princeling-backed 
firms’ access to bank loans, especially if they are non-SOEs, which is at the cost of 
non-princeling-backed firms. Secondly, according to the test results on bank lending 
decisions, banks prefer princeling-backed firms regardless of their profitability. 
Thirdly, the empirical results show that princeling-backed firms, holding better access 
to long-term bank loans which are afterwards converted into investment capital, tend 
to overinvest.  As a result, weakened relationship between investment growth and 
investment opportunity impairs investment efficiency in princeling-backed firms. 
Fourthly, we use the difference-in-difference method to capture the effect of the 
exogenous shock of the recent anticorruption campaign in China on princelings and 
corporate finance and investment and find that the anti-corruption campaign 
effectively changed the impacts of princeling connections, creating a fairer and more 
balanced economic environment. Moreover, princeling executives are found to be 
more powerful than princeling shareholders, due to their responsibility in corporate 
management and operations. Last but not least, princeling connections were found be 
more powerful than normal political connections.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, to the best 
of our knowledge, the impacts of princeling connections on corporate financing and 
investment are academically investigated for the first time in this study. The role and 
impacts of princeling connections, as phenomena distinct from normal political 
connections, have long been neglected. The analysis of princeling connections gives 
us an insight into the typical rent-seeking behaviour of corrupted government 
bureaucrats. Furthermore, based on agency theory, princelings are divided into two 
groups in regard to their different roles in corporate operations. The empirical results 
and discussion on princeling shareholders as principals and princeling executives as 
agents contribute to agency theory from a unique perspective. More importantly, we 
also explore the co-existence of princeling connections and normal political 
connections by examining and comparing their individual impacts on bank loans and 
investment activities. This paper views princeling connections as complementary to 
normal political connections, and this facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the 
role of political connections. 
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2. Hypothesis development 
2.1 Princeling connections and bank loans 
As the world’s largest emerging economy, China is making every effort to 
improve its economic environment. However, despite decades of progressive 
achievements in economic reform, China is still identified as a transforming economy 
with a high level of government intervention over various dimensions, including the 
allocation of key resources. Studies have found that good relationships with the 
government provide firms with preferential access to government subsidies, financing 
opportunities, investment opportunities, and protection from expropriation by the 
government (Chen, 2011; De Soto, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1994). Therefore, 
on the one hand, firms experience strong incentives to establish connections with the 
government to obtain privileges and protection. They also expect additional benefits 
from the connections, for instance favourable conditions when borrowing loans, 
exemption from taxes, and winning government contracts. For these tempting terms, 
firms are willing to sacrifice a small part of their earnings. On the other hand, 
government bureaucrats are stimulated to take advantage of their political power for 
personal benefit. They are able to provide convenience to firms under their 
jurisdiction due to their power over resource allocation and project approvals. Even 
though both sides are eager to ‘cooperate’, laws always act as a barrier between them 
to prevent the trade-off between money and power, and to protect the rights of other 
law-abiding firms. Consequently, acting as a proxy of former senior bureaucrats, 
princelings function as the bridge between the two interested parties, under the cover 
of loopholes in laws. The motives of both sides facilitate rent-seeking behaviours that 
take place through bribery and corruption. As a result, equipped with guaranteed 
government connections, princeling-backed firms are able to enjoy many direct and 
indirect advantages, which surely contributes to better corporate performance and 
development. Given this situation, it is not surprising that princeling-backed firms are 
considered to be favourable debtors by banks, especially state-owned banks, and that 
this directly results in more bank loans. 
To a further extent, according to Chen (2011), firms with different ownership 
structures may have diverse experiences in regard to political connections. On the one 
hand, due to weak property right protection accompanied by a long history of 
discrimination against entrepreneur enterprises in China, non-SOEs are always in a 
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disadvantageous position in the external financial market, and they experience 
stronger incentives to obtain princeling connections to turn the table. Once connected, 
non-SOEs are likely to receive considerable benefits. In non-SOEs, princeling 
connections help to remedy their inferiority (compared with naturally government-
connected SOEs) and even to gain superiority (compared with non-princeling-backed 
non-SOEs). Banks, mainly state-owned banks, may find it hard to reject loan 
applications from princeling-backed non-SOEs due to their political backgrounds. On 
the other hand, since SOEs are naturally connected to the government, they have 
already had a taste of every possible privilege. Thus, SOEs may not experience an 
improvement in their situation as a result of princeling connections. Furthermore, 
corruption in SOEs creates the potential for collusion between government 
bureaucrats and SOE managers to provide personal benefits for both (Pan and Tian, 
2017). The tunnelling issue in SOEs may even be aggravated by princelings, since 
their political backgrounds protect them from possible punishments, which does harm 
to princeling-backed firms. Overall, princeling-backed non-SOEs are favoured by 
banks compared to non-princeling-backed non-SOEs, while princeling-backed SOEs 
do not benefit from but even suffer from the connections. The above discussion gives 
rise to the following hypothesis: 
        H1a: Princeling connections help non-SOEs to gain more bank loans, while 
having negative impacts on access to bank loans in SOEs. 
H1a deals with the impact of princeling connections on access to bank loans in 
individual firms. Nevertheless, we are more interested in how princeling connections 
affect bank lending decisions. It is reasonable to expect that firm profitability is one of 
the most essential criteria for assessing bank loan applications. Usually, firms with 
better profitability are more likely to receive relatively more bank loans. Based on the 
argument above, princeling-backed firms gain more bank loans because they are 
considered to be better and safer debtors by banks. Therefore, it can be further 
assumed that banks tend to award more loans to princeling-backed firms, due to the 
privileges and protections they can get from the government, without worrying too 
much about their profitability. The situation is different from what normally happens. 
In other words, if firms establish princeling connections, even if their profitability is 
poorer, they are able to obtain more loans which were previously unavailable. To 
some extent, the privileges brought by princeling connections offset the deficiency of 
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poor firm profitability. Therefore, a sub-hypothesis is developed: 
        H1b: Bank lending to princeling-backed firms is less responsive to firm 
profitability than bank lending to firms that do not have princeling connections.  
 
2.2 Princeling connections and corporate investment 
As princeling connections are supposed to bring more bank loans, we are curious 
about their further influence on other aspects of corporate operations. Since external 
financing is one of the most common methods of raising investment capital, especially 
in China where other financial markets are relatively underdeveloped, it is worth 
investigating the relationship between additional bank loans and investment growth in 
princeling-backed firms. Chen et al. (2011) documented that normal political 
connections weaken the sensibility of investment expenditure to investment 
opportunities in SOEs, but have no significant influence in non-SOEs. In line with the 
research of Chen et al., this study explores the impacts of princeling connections on 
investment efficiency, expecting to reveal more details. We predict that the situations 
in SOEs and non-SOEs will be different for the same reason proposed earlier 
regarding bank loans. 
On the one hand, it is relatively easier for SOEs to access bank loans due to their 
inherent state-owned nature. Therefore, princeling connections do not dramatically 
increase their access to bank loans. To a further extend, no obvious changes are 
expected in their investment decisions. On the other hand, in princeling-backed non-
SOEs, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of additional bank loans, especially 
long-term bank loans, are transferred into investment expenditure. With excess 
financial capital, princeling-backed non-SOEs tend to invest more than they used to. 
Thus, investment growth should be increased by the presence of princeling 
connections as well. However, since princeling-backed non-SOEs are receiving more 
bank loans than they should, regardless of firm profitability, they are eagerly 
searching for more investment opportunities in addition to the optimal ones, resulting 
in their being less cautious when making investment decisions. Consequently, we 
predict that princeling-backed non-SOEs tend to overinvest as a result of their soft 
budgetary constraints, leading to lower investment efficiency: 
        H2: Princeling connections generally give rise to investment growth, and make 
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investment growth less responsive to investment opportunities in non-SOEs, but do 
not make investment growth less responsive to investment opportunities in SOEs. 
 
2.3 Princeling connections and the anti-corruption campaign 
H1 and H2 are proposed based on the argument that princeling connections work 
by means of bribery and corruption. More specifically, in this tripartite transaction, 
individual firms play the role of briber, and bureaucrats play the role of bribee, while 
princelings act as agents between the two interested parties. Equipped with the 
political network built by their fathers’ generation, princelings have easy access to 
incumbent bureaucrats who are their fathers’ former colleagues and subordinate 
officials. Utilising such networks, princelings enable the trade-off between personal 
benefits for corrupted bureaucrats and privileges for bribing firms. Undoubtedly, the 
intermediary princelings gain their own benefits during the process. As a result, 
bureaucrats’ willingness to exert political power and engage in corrupt activities, 
along with the actions of firms, facilitate the establishment of princeling connections 
in the first place. In summary, the improvement of corporate financing in princeling-
backed firms actually depends on corruption activities. Recently, the Chinese 
government decided to stop the chaos, and promoted a nationwide anti-corruption 
campaign, and this provides us with a suitable context for examining the impact of 
princeling connections in a natural experiment setting. At the end of 2012, the 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party launched an ‘eight-point’ Anti-
bureaucracy and Formalism Regulation, and declared the commencement of an anti-
corruption campaign. This was followed by very detailed implementations, and the 
severest-ever anti-corruption campaign has had significant influence in many respects, 
even at the firm level (Ke et al., 2016). During the progress of the campaign, a large 
number of corruption cases have been exposed, and corrupt bureaucrats were arrested 
in 2013 and 2014. Based on this anti-corruption activity, the impacts of princeling 
connections before and after the anti-corruption campaign will be compared to detect 
any changes. Basically, if the impacts of princeling connections do depend on corrupt 
activities, a sharp change is expected to be observed, given the success of the 
campaign. To illustrate the authenticity of this fact statistically, the influence of the 
anti-corruption campaign on the power of princeling connections is examined with the 
following hypothesis: 
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        H3: The impacts of princeling connections have been changed after the anti-
corruption campaign. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample 
3.1.1 Definition of key variables 
The most important variable in the models is Princelings. As mentioned in 
Section 1, ‘princelings’ refers to direct descendants of former senior government 
bureaucrats who were in provincial or higher-level positions. The Princelings variable 
is initially proposed in this study as a measure of this typical kind of political 
connection, which is differentiated from normal political connections, for its impacts 
have not yet been academically investigated. To avoid ambiguity, a firm is defined as 
princeling-backed if it satisfies both the following criteria: (1) one of its top 10 
shareholders or CEO or board members (including chairman) is a direct descendant of 
a former senior bureaucrat; (2) the former bureaucrat was in a provincial or higher-
level position. The first criterion ensures that the sample of princeling-backed firms 
comprises firms with princeling shareholders and firms with princeling executives. 
The second criterion ensures the study accords with the reality that only senior 
bureaucrats are considered to remain influential after their government tenure. 
Ultimately, a dummy variable Princelings is generated, which equals 1 if a listed firm 
is defined as princeling-backed and it equals 0 otherwise. 
Other than Princelings, normal political connections are also included as a 
control variable, and to enable a further comparison between the two types of political 
connections. In light of extant literature, normal political connections are said to occur 
when firms employ executives with governmental working experience. Precisely, a 
firm is considered to be politically connected if any of its CEO or board members 
(including chairman) is a former government official, or (current or former) deputy of 
the People's Congress or the People's Political Consultative Conference (Chen et al., 
2011; Liu et al., 2013). Hence, the dummy variable Normal PC is generated, which 
equals 1 if the listed firm employs executives with working experience in the 
government and it equals 0 otherwise. Dependent variables include Bank loan (Total 
bank loan, Long-term bank loan and Short-term bank loan) and Investment growth. A 
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set of selected variables were employed as control variables for other aspects of firm 
characteristics, including ROS, Tobin’s Q, Size, Tangibility and so on. Detailed 
definitions and calculations of the dependent and control variables are reported in 
Appendix A. In avoiding abnormal observations, all the variables are trimmed at the 1% 
level in each tail. 
 
3.1.2 Data collection 
The sample of princeling-backed firms was manually collected in two ways. 
Firstly, on the one hand, we searched through the searching engines of Google and 
Baidu, as well as from the reports in the state media Xinhua News Agency and other 
mainstream media, for all potential princelings who were possibly involved in 
business and thus made a princeling list. Since those princelings usually had attracted 
so much attention from public and media due to their special family backgrounds and 
personal anecdotes, various referential information to most of the princelings could be 
easily accessed through the internet. Therefore, we searched every potential princeling 
on the list for his/her family information, education background, career and life 
experience.  Accordingly, we archived a brief profile for each princeling. On the other 
hand, according to the Securities Law of the People's Republic of China and the 
disclosure rules of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), IPO 
prospectuses of firms must contain sections on “Profile of Directors and Senior 
Managers”, “Background of Large Shareholders”, and “Background of Founding 
Investors”. Similarly, annual reports of listed firms must provide resumes of 
incumbent executives, including their year of birth, educational background, and 
professional history. Depending on the publicly accessible information on both sides, 
we searched in IPO prospectuses and annual reports for executives/shareholders who 
shared the same name with the princelings, and then compared the resumes of 
executives/shareholders to the profiles of princelings. An exact match between one 
executive’s/shareholder’s resume and a princeling’s profile implied that they were the 
same person. In other words, we were able to confirm that this firm was princeling-
backed. By repeating this process, we went through the long list of princelings 
manually to identify princeling-backed firms.  
Secondly, we searched through the official website of the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China for exposed corruption 
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cases that involved descendants of former senior bureaucrats. Afterwards, related 
information was collected by utilising the searching engines of Google and Baidu, as 
well as reports in the state media Xinhua News Agency and other mainstream media 
if applicable. If any of the aforementioned information resources indicated that a firm 
was related to princelings, we went through its IPO prospectus and annual reports for 
a double check. Once all necessary information had been verified, the firm was added 
to the sample of princeling-backed firms.  
To conclude, if an executive or/and a top-10 shareholder were recognised as a 
princeling by either of the two ways above, the firm he/she was serving was 
considered to be princeling-backed. To clarify further, because small shareholders do 
not have sufficient influence on corporate operations, if a princeling only held shares 
(not being an executive) but was not ranked in top 10 shareholders, the firm was not 
considered as princeling-backed frim. We admit, due to the limitation of information 
disclosure in China, we are unable to have a complete princeling data set. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the sample of princeling-backed firms collected from 
two sources in this study is validly representative for the princeling-backed firm 
population. If the estimated results from the limited data set of princeling-backed 
firms are significant and have explanation power, the estimated results from the whole 
population of princeling-backed firms would have more explanation power. 
 
With respect to the process of basic data collection, we firstly include all the 
qualified firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (SHSE and 
SZSE) from 2004 to 2014, excluding the Small and Medium Sized Enterprise board 
(SEM) and Growth Enterprise Market board (GEM). In order to eliminate abnormal 
observations, listed firms in the financial sector are excluded due to their unique 
accounting standard and special capital structures, as well as firms with Special 
Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) status according to usual data processing 
methods. Most of the data is collected from multiple sub-databases in the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). All the financial information 
and indexes are collected from the Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database and 
Chinese Listed Firm Financial Variables Analysis Database. In addition, the Chinese 
Listed Firm Corporate Governance Database and the Chinese Listed Firm Shareholder 
Analysis Database are used to collect background information about firm shareholders 
and executives. In total, we have 19440 firm year observations. 
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3.1.3 Sample distribution and summary statistics 
Table 1 reports on the sample distribution of princeling-backed listed firms. 
Panel A shows the distribution by year and ownership structure. On average, 7.63% 
SOEs and 7.90% non-SOEs were princeling-backed. There was an obvious drop in 
numbers of princeling-backed firms after the anti-corruption campaign at the end of 
2012. According to Panel B, the sample distribution by industry, princeling-backed 
firms were apparently concentrated in several industries. The highest densities of 
princeling-backed firms were spotted in the mining, transportation and business 
service industries, followed by the resources, real estate and utilities industries. This 
distribution supports our argument that princeling connections exert an influence by 
participating in the sectors with high levels of government intervention, for instance 
the real estate and utilities industries. In addition, princeling-backed firms in the 
business services and utilities industries provide circumstantial evidence that 
princelings have shortcuts to insider information and privileges in winning 
government contracts. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of all variables included in our regression 
models and univariate test results of dependent variables between princeling-backed 
and non-princeling-backed firms. According to Panel B, princeling-backed firms 
received significantly more bank loans compared to non-princeling-backed firms, 
including long-term and short-term bank loans. Simultaneously, princeling-backed 
firms experienced higher growth rates in investment. All the univariate tests results 
are preliminarily consistent with our hypotheses. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
3.2 Regression models 
As proposed in Section 2 regarding the hypotheses, this paper mainly explores the 
impacts of princeling connections on corporate external financing, bank lending 
decisions, and corporate investment decisions, as well as the influence of the anti-
corruption campaign on princeling connections. Hence, a set of regression models is 
developed as follows. In order to investigate the primary hypothesis regarding 
corporate bank loans, the first regression model is established in the light of Liu et al. 
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(2016). 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                               +𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                               +𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
    where the dependent variable Bank loan is the level of access to bank loans, 
including total bank loans, long-term bank loans and short-term bank loans. The 
variable Princelings is an essential dummy, which equals 1 if a firm is recognised as 
princeling-backed and equals 0 otherwise. SOE is a dummy that equals 1 for SOEs 
and 0 for non-SOEs. The interaction term between Princelings and SOE shows the 
diverse impacts of princeling connections on firms with different ownership structures. 
Normal PC is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm is politically connected by 
executives with government working experience and it equals 0 otherwise. ROS 
(return on sales) stands for firm profitability, and Tobin’s Q represents investment 
opportunity. Two groups of indicators that control for the financial and corporate 
governance characteristics of different firms are included. The former includes Size 
(natural logarithm of total assets) and Tangibility. The latter includes Board (natural 
logarithm of board size) and Independence (percentage of board independence), 
please see Appendix A. Year and Industry dummy variables are also included to 
control for year and industry fixed effects. 
    The coefficient of Princelings, β1, is expected to be significantly positive, 
supporting the hypothesis that princelings generally improve the access to bank loans 
in firms. According to H1a, the coefficient of the interaction term, β2, is expected to 
be significantly negative, suggesting princeling connections bring relatively more 
bank loans to non-SOEs compared to SOEs. In addition, the coefficient of SOE, β3, is 
expected to be significantly positive, reflecting the fact that SOEs normally receive 
more bank loans than non-SOEs because of their nature connections to the 
government.  
    In order to test H1b regarding bank lending decisions, regression (2) is 
constructed on the basis of regression (1). ROS is a measurement of firm profitability, 
which is considered to be a common criterion adopted by banks when making lending 
decisions. In most cases, a firm with high profitability is likely to get more bank loans 
because of its better debt repayment ability. Therefore, the interaction term between 
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Princelings and ROS reveals whether princeling connections distort this decision-
making rule. 
𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
                                           +𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
                                           +𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                           +𝛽𝛽9𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                          （2） 
where all the variables are defined in the same way as in regression (1). The 
coefficient of ROS, β3, is expected to be significantly positive which indicates the fact 
that firm profitability is usually positively correlated with access to bank loans in 
individual firms. More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
Princelings and ROS, β2, is expected to be significantly negative to provide evidence 
to support H1b that princeling connections distort the profitability criterion of bank 
lending decisions. 
Furthermore, regression (3) is structured to examine H2. Following Chen (2011), 
the dependent variable is investment growth, while Tobin’s Q represents investment 
opportunity. Similar to regression (2), normally, investment growth is positively 
responsive to investment opportunities, reflecting healthy investment efficiency. Thus, 
the interaction term between Princelings and Tobin’s Q indicates whether princeling 




� = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
                               +𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
                               +𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                            (3) 
        The coefficient of Tobin’s Q, β3, is expected to be significantly positive, showing 
the normal relationship between investment opportunities and growth. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of Princelings, β1, is expected to be significantly positive as well, which 
indicates princeling connections promote investment growth due to the extra bank 
loans brought by them. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
Princelings and Tobin’s Q is expected to be significantly negative to show that 
princeling connections indirectly do harm to investment efficiency. 
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        Finally, to test H3 on the influence of the anti-corruption campaign, regression (4) 
and (5) are developed as follows to give separate results on bank lending decisions 
and corporate investment decisions. The control variables are also different for 
different tests. The whole sample is firstly divided in to two subsamples for SOEs and 
non-SOEs, and each subsample is further divided into two parts to indicate princeling-
backed and non-princeling-backed firms respectively. 
𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 × 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 




� = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 × 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵′𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
                     +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                           (5) 
In regression (4), the coefficient of the interaction term between Campaign and 
ROS is expected to be significantly positive in princeling-backed firms, suggesting the 
importance of firm profitability has been reinforced and that bank lending decisions 
have returned to normal due to the anti-corruption campaign. Similarly, in regression 
(5), the coefficient of the interaction term between Campaign and Tobin's Q is 
expected to be significantly positive in princeling-backed firms as well, reflecting that 
the prediction that the campaign has restored the healthy relationship between 
investment opportunities and growth, and that the campaign has eliminated the 
crowding out effect previously caused by princeling connections. 
 
4 Empirical results and analysis 
4.1 Impact of princeling connections on firm’s ability to access bank loans 
To test the primary hypothesis regarding the relationship between princeling 
connections and level of access to corporate bank loans, regression (1) was run for 
empirical evidence. Table 3 reports the impact of princeling connections on access to 
total bank loans, long-term bank loans and short-term bank loans respectively. The 
results of a basic regression without the dummy variable SOE are shown in columns 1, 
3 and 5. The coefficients of Princelings are all positively significant at the 1% level, 
which indicates princeling connections generally improve the access to all types of 
bank loans.  
  18 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
Based on the reasoning described above, the dummy variable SOE was 
introduced to examine the individual impact of princeling connections in firms with 
different ownership structures. The detailed empirical results are shown in columns 2, 
4 and 6. Again, the coefficients of Princelings are positive and significant at the 1% 
level, providing extra evidence that princeling connections ensure better access to 
bank loans. Given the circumstance that the largest banks in China are all controlled 
by the government, there have always been privileges for princeling-backed firms 
which have enabled them to obtain more bank loans than other firms. Furthermore, 
the coefficients of the dummy variable SOE are all positively significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that SOEs normally receive significantly more bank loans than non-
SOEs due to their inherited connections to the government. More importantly, the 
coefficients of the interaction term between Princelings and SOE are significantly 
negative at the 1% level in column 2 and 4. Considered together with the coefficients 
of Princelings, the interaction term coefficients indicate that princeling connections 
help non-SOEs to gain significantly more bank loans, especially more long-term bank 
loans than non-princeling-backed non-SOEs, but have significantly negative impacts 
on access to bank loans in SOEs, which is consistent with H1a. However, the 
interaction term coefficient in column 6 is negative but not statistically significant, 
which suggests that the difference between the impacts of princeling connections on 
access to short-term bank loans in SOEs and non-SOEs is not significant. It is not 
surprising that princeling connections do not bring extra bank loans to SOEs, because 
the nature governmental connections of SOEs have basically the same effects as 
princeling connections and are even stronger in many cases. Furthermore, it is to be 
expected that the impacts of princeling connections on access to bank loans are 
negative in SOEs due to the collusion between corrupt bureaucrats and princelings 
and tunnelling issue. On the contrary, the situation in non-SOEs is just the opposite. 
Due to the institutional background of poor property rights protection and a long 
history of discrimination against privately-owned enterprises, princeling-backed non-
SOEs experience dramatic boosts in their access to bank loans. Due to their 
governmental connections and protections, princeling-backed non-SOEs allay the 
concerns of banks, and are therefore at the same level as SOEs when competing for 
loans.  
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Another important variable, Normal PC, is included in the regression as a 
comparable term, as well as a control variable for Princelings. The impact of normal 
political connections on access to bank loans has already been demonstrated in the 
literature (Berkmanet et al., 2009; Blau et al., 2013; Yeh et al., 2013). The coefficients 
of Normal PC in every column are all positively significant, illustrating the bank-
loan-winning nature of normal political connections. Nevertheless, at the same 1% 
significance level, the coefficients of Princelings are always much larger than those of 
Normal PC, indicating that the power of princeling connections are much greater than 
the power of normal political connections. The two types of political connections 
work towards the same outcome which may even have a synergistic effect. The 
relationship between princeling connections and normal political connections will be 
further discussed in Section 4.5.2. The inclusion of Normal PC further proves that, 
after controlling for the positive effect of normal political connections, princeling 
connections still have additional power over access to bank loans. In addition to 
Normal PC, other control variables all take the expected signs. In particular, as one of 
the most essential criteria of bank lending decisions, ROS is included for further 
analysis. The coefficients of ROS are significantly positive at the 1% level, 
demonstrating the positive relationship between bank lending and firm profitability. 
In summary, non-SOEs have the incentive to establish princeling connections 
since princeling connections do improve their financing performance. Such incentives 
are actually stimulated by the plights of non-SOEs when they are competing with 
SOEs. Princeling connections strengthen the competitive power of non-SOEs. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the superior performance of princeling-backed 
non-SOEs comes at the cost of an even harsher situation for non-princeling-backed 
non-SOEs. The allocation of limited external financial resources to overall non-SOEs 
now favours princeling-backed non-SOEs, and this gradually crowds out the living 
space for non-princeling-backed non-SOEs and finally does harm to the general 
economy. The Chinese government launched the severest ever anti-corruption 
campaign which has effectively cut off corruption by princeling connections. Detailed 
empirical results will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
 
4.2 Impact of princeling connections on bank lending decisions 
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In Section 4.1, it is demonstrated that princeling connections do provide firms 
with better access to bank loans. Therefore, since banks always have a set of criteria 
to follow while making lending decisions, how do princeling connections change 
bank loan approval standards? Based on the discussion in Section 2.1, we suggest that 
this change is related to firm profitability. Firm profitability is considered to be a solid 
indicator for bank loan repayment. If a firm does not show satisfactory profitability, it 
is rational to assume that it would not have enough capital to repay its debts. This 
confirms the importance of firm profitability in bank lending decisions. According to 
Zheng and Zhu (2013), when loans are awarded to firms with high profitability, this is 
a good bank lending decision. Therefore, in normal cases, bank lending should be 
highly responsive to firm profitability, represented by the relationship between Total 
bank loan and ROS in regression (2). To find out the answer to the question of how 
princeling connections affect bank lending decisions, regression (2) was run to test 
H1b which predicts that princeling connections weaken the role of profitability in 
determining the outcomes of loan applications. Table 4 reports on the impact of 
princeling connections on bank lending decisions.  
Insert Table 4 here 
In Table 4, the coefficients of Princelings are significantly positive at the 1% 
level, regardless of different firm ownership structures, confirming the result in 
Section 4.1 that princeling-backed firms do receive more bank loans. The coefficients 
of ROS are also significantly positive, suggesting that bank lending is normally highly 
responsive to firm profitability. However, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between Princelings and ROS is significantly negative at the 5% level in column 1 for 
the whole sample, which indicates that princelings connections generally weaken the 
positive relationship between bank lending and firm profitability. To be specific, the 
level of access to bank loans of a firm is normally positively related with its 
profitability, as demonstrated by the statistically significant and positive coefficients 
of ROS. However, according to the results, such relationship is weakened in 
princeling-backed firms, which reveals banks value princeling connections more than 
firm’s profitability. In other words, when a firm is princeling-backed, banks are 
willing to lend more loans even if the firm is not eligible for the extra loans if judged 
by its profitability. Upon the fact that firm profitability is one of the key factors of 
bank loans approval, the significantly negative coefficient shows princeling 
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connections make bank lending less responsive to firm profitability. This result 
suggests that, to some extent, princeling connections help firms to win bank loans in a 
way of distorting bank lending decisions.  In columns 2 and 3, the coefficients of the 
interaction term are significantly negative at the 1% and 5% levels, leading to the 
same conclusion that princeling connections make bank lending decisions less 
responsive to firm profitability. More specifically, the coefficient in column 2 for 
SOEs is larger in magnitude than in column 3 for non-SOEs (-0.234 vs. -0.025), and 
the coefficient in column 2 is more significant than the coefficient in column 3 (the 1% 
level compared to the 5% level). We also conduct the Chow test to examine the 
difference between the coefficients of the interaction term for SOEs and non-SOEs, 
and the result shows that the impact of princeling connections on bank lending 
decisions is stronger for SOEs. This result reflects the difference between the two 
ownership structures. Princeling connections in SOEs reinforce the power of their 
natural governmental connections, which makes princeling-backed SOEs the most 
reliable debtors regardless of their profitability. Overall, the empirical results are 
consistent with H1b.  
 
4.3 Impact of princeling connections on corporate investment decisions 
According to the analysis in Sections 4.1 on Table 3, princeling connections help 
both SOEs and non-SOEs to gain more bank loans of all types. Moreover, princeling-
backed non-SOEs receive significantly more long-term bank loans than princeling-
backed SOEs. To a further extent, since external financing capital is always the main 
source of investment expenditure, we are more interested in how the increase in long-
term bank loans affects corporate investment decisions.  
Table 5 reports the impact of princeling connections on investment activity in the 
whole sample, as well as in SOEs and non-SOEs separately. The results can be 
analysed from two perspectives, investment expenditure and investment efficiency. 
First of all, it is clear that the coefficients of Princelings are significantly positively at 
the 5% level in columns 1 and 3, indicating princeling connections promote 
investment growth mainly in non-SOEs. This result is consistent with the discussion 
in Section 4.1. The dramatic increase in access to long-term bank loans consequently 
boosts investment growth in princeling-backed non-SOEs. Secondly, with respect to 
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investment efficiency, the relationship between investment growth and Tobin’s Q is 
considered to be a proxy. In details, the significantly positive coefficients of Tobin’s 
Q, representing investment opportunities, suggest that investment growth is normally 
highly responsive to investment opportunities. Investment decisions are rational if 
increased investment growth is backed up by more investment opportunities. Again, 
the coefficients of the interaction term between Princelings and Tobin’s Q are what 
we are most interested in. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in columns 1, revealing that princelings 
connections generally weaken the positive relationship between investment growth 
and investment opportunities. Specifically, while the significantly positive 
coefficients of Tobin’s Q suggest that investment growth is positively related with 
investment opportunities (Tobin’s Qs), this relationship is significantly weakened in 
princeling-backed firms. This result suggests that, with excess loans, princeling-
backed firms no longer consider investment opportunities as much as they should 
(compared to non-princeling-backed firms). Thus, princeling-backed firms are likely 
to extend their investment to sub-optimal opportunities instead of investing in optimal 
opportunities only, which results in lower investment efficiency than non-princeling-
backed firms. Moreover, the coefficient in column 3 is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level and is larger in magnitude compare to the all sample 
coefficient in column 1. This result suggests that in princeling-backed non-SOEs, 
investment growth becomes less responsive to investment opportunities, resulting in 
lower investment efficiency. Comparatively, the results in column 2 show that the 
impacts of princeling connections on investment decisions in SOEs is not significant 
which are consistent with H2.  
Insert Table 5 here 
 
4.4The influence of the anti-corruption campaign on princeling connections  
As discussed in previous sections, the benefits brought by princeling connections 
are at the cost of non-princeling-backed firms. In a financial market with limited 
capital resources, princeling-backed firms are crowding out non-princeling-backed 
firms, which is harmful to the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. 
Being aware of the severity of this corruption-related issue, the Chinese government 
has taken actions to make up for the loopholes in laws, among which the anti-
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corruption campaign is the most representative activity. Table 6 shows the impact of 
the anti-corruption campaign on princeling connections regarding bank lending 
decisions. Campaign is a time dummy variable adopting a breakpoint at the end of 
year 2012, because the anti-corruption campaign began at this time. In order to 
investigate the influence of the campaign, an interaction term between Campaign and 
ROS is generated. Consistent with the method employed in former tests, the whole 
sample is divided into two subsamples – SOEs and non-SOEs. Furthermore, to avoid 
cubic terms, Princelings is taken out of the original regression and used to divide the 
subsamples into smaller groups. More specifically, both SOEs and non-SOEs are 
further divided into princeling-backed and non-princeling-backed firms. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Based on the discussion in Section 4.2, princeling connections have a major 
impact by weakening the relationship between level of access to bank loans and firm 
profitability. Therefore, according to Table 6, the significantly positive coefficients of 
the interaction term in columns 1 and 3 suggest that the relationship between Total 
bank loan and ROS has been reinforced in princeling-backed SOEs and non-SOEs by 
the campaign. Since various corruption activities, including collusion between 
business owners and government bureaucrats have been curtailed by the campaign, 
princeling-backed firms are no longer able to earn extra bank loans utilising such 
connections. Consequently, bank loans are reallocated, leading to a recovery in the 
level of access to loans in non-princeling-backed firms, which is demonstrated by the 
significantly positive coefficients of Campaign in columns 2 and 4. The results are 
consistent with H3. 
    At the meantime, Table 7 reports the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on 
the relationship between princeling connections and investment decisions. Similarly, 
the key interaction term between Campaign and Tobin’s Q is included, and the whole 
sample is divided into four subsamples. The significantly positive coefficients of the 
interaction term in columns 1 and 3 show that in princeling-backed firms the positive 
relationship between investment growth and Tobin’s Q was restored after the 
campaign. It can be concluded that the impact of princeling connections on 
investment decisions has been weakened by the campaign, providing additional 
empirical evidence for H3. 
Insert Table 7 here 
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4.5 Additional analysis 
4.5.1 Heterogeneity of princeling connections 
This study expects to gain an insight into the heterogeneity of princelings 
regarding their different roles in firms. To be more specific, in the light of agency 
theory, we intend to further investigate the impacts of princeling connections from the 
perspective of conflicts between principals and agents. Hence, princeling executives 
are placed in an “agent” subsample, and princelings who are controlling shareholders 
are placed in a ‘principal’ subsample. Princelings who are controlling shareholders 
were initially included in this study for their undoubtedly important role in corporate 
operations. According to the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
general meetings of shareholders are in charge of decision-making, including 
investment plans and management policy. Necessarily, based on the one-share-one-
vote rule, the impact of princelings who are controlling shareholders should also be 
examined to provide a comprehensive analysis of the heterogeneity of princeling 
connections. 
Table 8 shows a comparison between princeling shareholders and princeling 
executives regarding the impact of princeling connections on access to bank loans. 
The whole sample is firstly divided into two sub-samples based on different 
ownership structures, and each sub-sample is further divided into two smaller sub-
samples representing princeling shareholders and princeling executives. According to 
Princelings in the first row, the coefficients of princeling executives (in columns 2, 4 
and 6) are much larger than those of princeling shareholders (in columns 1, 3 and 5). 
The results suggest that princeling executives have much stronger loan-earning 
capacities compared to princeling shareholders, even though they both significantly 
improve access to total bank loans.  
Insert Table 8 here 
 Similarly, Table 9 and 10 show the comparison between princeling shareholders 
and princeling executives regarding their impacts on bank lending decisions and 
corporate investment decisions.  Referring to the coefficients of Princelings in Table 9, 
the results are consistent with those in Table 8. Furthermore, it is quite clear that the 
significantly negative coefficients of the interaction term in columns 2, 4 and 6 reveal 
that princeling executives significantly distort the relationship between bank lending 
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and ROS. However, princeling shareholders do not share the same effect, while none 
of the coefficients in columns 1, 3 and 5 are significant. Therefore, the conclusion is 
that princeling executives have a stronger impact on bank lending decisions. Table 10 
shows a similar situation where princeling executives have much stronger impacts on 
reducing investment efficiency. The comparison between the two types of princelings 
gives us a deeper insight into their characteristics.  It is clear that princeling 
executives play a much more important role. The reason may be traced to agency 
theory. As principals, if princeling shareholders decide to pursue certain goal utilising 
their political power, they are more likely to suffer from conflict between principals 
and agents due to their different roles. However, princeling executives are normally 
free of such troubles for they are directly responsible for corporate management and 
operations. Additionally, it is possible that princeling shareholders tend to keep their 
political backgrounds under cover and somehow pursue their goals secretly. 
Insert Table 9 here 
Insert Table 10 here 
 
4.5.2 Princeling connections and normal political connections 
Princeling connections are introduced in this paper as a new perspective on 
political connections. Therefore, normal political connections should be included in 
the analysis as well to enable a comprehensive conclusion. In particular, the 
interacting relationship between the two types of political connections is worth 
exploring. Tables11and 12 give a comparison between the impacts of princeling 
connections in firms with and without normal political connections. Specifically, 
columns 1 and 3 show the situation when princelings and normal political connections 
co-exist, while columns 2 and 4 include firms with princeling connections only. 
Insert Table 11 here 
Insert Table 12 here 
The extant literature demonstrates that normal political connections do improve 
access to bank loans. Given that, the significantly positive coefficients of Princelings 
in Table 11, especially in columns1 and 3, suggest that princeling connections help to 
gain more bank loans over and above the impact of normal political connections. In 
other words, even though the two political connections have the same impact on 
access to bank loans, they both make their individual contributions. The impact of 
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princeling connections is not obscured by the impact of normal political connections, 
and there may even be a synergistic effect between them. However, the coefficients of 
the interaction term are statistically significant and negative in columns 2 and 4, 
indicating that the distortion of bank lending decisions by princeling connections is 
only observed in firms without normal political connections. In Table 12, the impact 
of princeling connections on investment decisions is observed in non-SOEs only, 
which is consistent with the discussion in Section 4.3. The coefficients of the 
interaction term between Princelings and Tobin’s Q are statistically significant and 
negative in columns 3 and 4 at the 10% and 1% levels respectively (-0.141 vs. -0.152), 
indicating that the impact of princeling connections on investment decisions is much 
stronger in non-SOEs without normal political connections. 
 
4.6 Robustness results 
4.6.1 Potential endogeneity issue 
In this section, the potential endogeneity issue in our regression models is 
addressed. The most possible cause of the issue is that princeling connections are not 
entirely exogenous in the regression models. More specifically, since the regression 
models adopt many indexes that represent different aspects of corporate operations, it 
is difficult to tell if princeling connections have no correlation whatsoever with any of 
them. For instance, regarding profitability, one could argue that some firms are 
princeling-backed because they are generous employers due to their good corporate 
performance. Otherwise, it could be argued that princelings are willing to take 
positions in a firm due to its excellent corporate performance and operation. As a 
result, princeling connections could be endogenous if correlated with profitability, 
which gives rise to a potential endogeneity problem. 
In order to solve the potential endogeneity of princelings connections, difference 
in difference (DiD) method is adopted. As mentioned in section 2.3, the anti-
corruption campaign can be considered as an appropriate event for a natural 
experiment to be used in the DiD method. In section 4.4, the influence of the anti-
corruption campaign on the impacts of princeling connections is briefly analysed in 
pooled regressions. In this section, random effect model is applied to test the 
robustness of the results of the impacts of princeling connections on access to bank 
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loans and investment growth by utilizing the influence of the campaign. Fixed effect 
model is not a proper way to solve the endogeneity issue in this study, because the 
value of the dummy variable Princelings changes in different firms so that the term 
Princelings will be omitted in fixed effect regression results. Following the DiD 
method, princeling-backed firms are considered as the treated group, while others as 
the control group. The anti-corruption campaign is the shock that naturally divide the 
whole sample period into two parts. Based on the empirical results that a princeling-
backed firm have better access to bank loans and have higher investment growth if 
compared with non-princeling-backed firms, and the campaign weakens the impacts 
of princeling connections, such difference between the two types of firms is supposed 
to reduce after the campaign.  
Table 13 reports the DiD regression results of the random effect models. In this 
model, the robustness of the results that princeling-backed firms have better access to 
bank loans and increase investment growth is examined. According to Panel A in 
Table 13, the coefficients of Princelings are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level, which is consistent with the previous results that princeling connections 
help to improve the level of access to bank loans. We are more concerned about the 
coefficients of the interaction term between Princelings and Campaign. The 
coefficient in column 1 is significantly negative at the 5% level. Considered together 
with the coefficient of Princelings, the interaction term coefficient in column 1 
indicates that the positive impact of princeling connections on access to bank loans is 
changed to negative impact after the anti-corruption campaign. This result reflects the 
fact that princeling-backed firms, especially non-SOEs, experienced a hard time after 
the campaign due to the stringent regulations on princelings and incumbent 
bureaucrats. The sharp reduction of corrupt activities broke the channel through which 
princeling connections work. The coefficients of the interaction term in columns 2 and 
3 are both negative. Moreover, the coefficient in column 3 for non-SOE s is more 
significant (the 1% level compared to the 10% level) and is larger in magnitude than 
the coefficient in column 2 for SOEs. We also conduct the Chow test to examine the 
difference between the interaction term coefficients for SOEs and non-SOEs. 
Considered together with the coefficients of Princelings, the interaction term 
coefficients in columns 2 and 3 suggest that, after the campaign, the negative impact 
of princelings connections on access to bank loans is more severe in non-SOEs. Since 
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princeling-backed non-SOEs benefited more than princeling-backed SOEs, they are 
more affected by the anti-corruption campaign.  
Panel B in Table 13 shows the difference in difference random effect model 
regression results of the impacts of princelings connections on investment growth. 
Similarly, we are most interest in the coefficients of the interaction term between 
Princelings and Campaign. The coefficients are all negative in three columns. Most 
importantly, the coefficient in column 3 for non-SOE s is more significant (the 5% 
level compared to the 10% level) and is larger in magnitude than the coefficient in 
column 2 for SOEs, which is consistent with the Chow test result. Considered 
together with the coefficients of Princelings, the interaction term coefficients suggest 
that, after the campaign, the previously positive impact of princelings connections on 
investment growth is changed to negative impact, and the negative impact is more 
severe in non-SOEs.  The reason is that princeling connections are no longer helpful 
and princelings are under stringent regulations after the campaign, which has a 
negative influence on princeling-backed firms, especially non-SOEs.  
Insert Table 13 here 
 
4.6.2 Other robustness tests 
 Other than employing the instrumental variable, alternative measurements of 
dependent variables are adopted to give more evidence on the robustness of the 
fundamental models. Panel A in Table 14 shows the impact of princeling connections 
on change in total accessible bank loans, change in accessible long-term bank loans 
and change in accessible short-term bank loans, as a replacement for the originally 
used level of access to bank loans. The significantly positive coefficients of 
Princelings suggest that the conclusion about its positive impacts on access to bank 
loans is robust. Nevertheless, the positive impact is stronger for changes in short-term 
bank loans, while it is not significant for changes in long-term bank loans. Meanwhile, 
the significantly negative coefficients of the interaction term indicate that princeling 
connections guarantee more bank loans in non-SOEs, which is consistent with the 
discussion in Section 4.1. More specifically, the impact is also stronger on changes in 
short-term bank loans compared to changes in long-term bank loans.  
Insert Table 14 here 
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We further test robustness of regression (2) regarding bank lending decisions, 
using change in accessible total bank loans to replace the access to total bank loans. 
According to Panel B in Table 14, the coefficients of Princelings are significant and 
take the same sign as their corresponding coefficients in Table 4, while the 
coefficients of the interactions term in columns 1 and 3 are significantly negative, 
indicating the robustness of the conclusion that princeling connections help to gain 
more bank loans by distorting bank lending decisions in non-SOEs. 
        Finally, Panel C in Table 14 shows the impact of princeling connections on 
changes in investment expenditure as a replacement for investment growth. The most 
important term is the interaction between Princelings and Tobin’s Q. The coefficients 
are significantly negative at the 5% level in columns 1 and 3, demonstrating that 
princeling connections make change in investment expenditure less responsive to 
investment opportunities, especially in non-SOEs. The results provide evidence of the 
robustness of the discussion in Section 4.3. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates another type of political connection in addition to normal 
political connections. Specifically, princeling connections are proposed as a new, 
separate form of political connection in the Chinese market due to their significant 
influence. We are interested in the role of princeling connections as a complement to 
normal political connections in corporate operations. Based on the hypotheses in 
Section 2, four regression models are developed and run, using the data of Chinese 
listed firms from 2004 to 2015. The impacts of princeling connections on different 
dimensions, including corporate financing, investment activities and bank lending 
decisions are analysed to generate a report on the situation of princeling-backed firms. 
Empirical results suggest that princeling connections generally ensure firms, 
especially non-SOEs, are given better access to all types of bank loans. Banks prefer 
princeling-backed non-SOEs due to the privileges and protections they can obtain 
from the government, which makes them safer debtors compared to non-princeling-
backed non-SOEs. Correspondingly, bank lending becomes less responsive to firm 
profitability in princeling-backed firms because banks are considering the favourable 
connections of a firm rather than just its profitability when lending decisions are made. 
  30 
 
Furthermore, a liberal supply of bank loans, especially long-term bank loans, 
ultimately results in overinvesting by princeling-backed non-SOEs. In details, 
overinvesting makes investment expenditure and growth less responsive to investment 
opportunities, which results in lower investment efficiency. However, any privileges 
enjoyed by princeling-backed firms are at the cost of non-princeling-backed firms, so 
that they are faced with an even hasher financing environment. Fortunately, the 
Chinese government took immediate actions, of which its anti-corruption campaign 
was the most representative, to create a fairer and healthier economic environment. It 
has been demonstrated in this paper that the impacts of princeling connections have 
been significantly changed after the anti-corruption campaign. In addition, tests on the 
heterogeneity of princelings show that princeling executives play a more important 
role in firms than princeling shareholders. When it comes to the co-existence of the 
two different types of political connections, it is documented that princeling 
connections are able to further improve the access to bank loans of firms with normal 
political connections, which means the two types of connections may have a 
synergistic effect on corporate financing. As mentioned in the data collection process, 
we admit that we do not have a complete princeling data set due to the limitation of 
information disclosure in China. However, despite of possible missing observations, 
our empirical results are statistically significant, which suggests that our findings 
should remain for the population of princeling-backed firms.  
 In conclusion, princeling connections are a double-edged sword, and princeling-
backed firms have their gains and losses. Nevertheless, princeling connections are 
closely related with corruption, or in other words trade-offs between money and 
power. Therefore, the collapse of princeling connections after the anti-corruption 
campaign has had a positive impact on the Chinese market. 
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Empirical results 
Table 1. Sample distribution  
Panel A: Distribution by year and ownership structure 
Year SOEs Non-SOEs 
 No. of 
sample 
No. of  
connected  




No. of  
connected  
% of  
connected 
2004 957 79  8.25 296  36  12.1 
2005 963 92  9.55 382  42  10.9 
2006 947 86  9.08 395  37  9.36 
2007 943 79  8.37 476  49  10.2 
2008 950 82  8.63 571  47  8.23 
2009 959 63  6.56 616  52  8.44 
2010 975 71  7.28 747  59  7.89 
2011 1012 70  6.91 1059  80  7.55 
2012 1007 75  7.44 1294  91  7.03 
2013 1022 65  6.36 1407  95  6.75 
2014 1017 59  5.80 1445  99  6.85 
Total 10752 821  7.63 8688  687  7.90 
 
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
 
This table shows sample distribution by year and ownership structure, as well as by 
industry.  
Industry No. of 
sample 
No. of  
connected  
% of  
connected 
Agriculture 216 6 2.77 
Mining 666 118 17.7 
Manufacturing 12161 744 6.11 
Electricity, gas and water 873 116 13.2 
Construction 513 6 1.16 
Wholesale and retail 1198 48 4.00 
Transportation 918 144 15.6 
Information technology 695 55 7.91 
Real estate 1134 152 13.4 
Leasing and business services 261 50 19.1 
Utilities 207 30 14.4 
Service 146 11 7.53 
Conglomerate 452 28 6.19 
Total 19440 1508 7.75 
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Table 2. Summary statistics and univariate test of key variables 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 Mean Median 25th quartile 75th 
quartile 
StD 
Total bank loan (%) 15.9 12.9 5.00 29.61 17.7 
Long-term bank loan (%) 6.18 3.81 0.00 9.10 7.23 
Short-term bank loan (%) 7.25 2.00 0.00 11.10 1.72 
Investment growth 0.09 0.15 -0.56 0.75 1.21 
Tobin’s Q 1.91 1.42 0.79 2.41 1.69 
ROS (%) 3.07 3.06 0.02 9.13 1.20 
Leverage (%) 0.47 0.47 0.29 0.62 0.24 
Ln(Size) 21.62 21.47 20.75 22.31 1.26 
Tangibility (%) 24.90  21.46 11.00 35.86 7.75 
Board 9.02 9 8 9 1.86 
Independence (%) 35.45 33.33 33.33 33.33 6.45 
Princelings 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 
Normal PC 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests between princeling-backed and non-princeling-backed firms 
Variables With princelings Without princelings t-value 
Total bank loan 0.18 0.13 3.46*** 
Long-term bank loan 0.08 0.06 2.95*** 
Short-term bank loan 0.08 0.07 2.16** 
Investment growth 0.15 0.07 2.26** 
This table shows summary statistics and univariate test of key variables. Detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. 
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Table 3. The impact of princelings connections on bank loan 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
1                   2 
Long-term bank loan 
3                   4 
Short-term bank loan 
5                  6 
Princelings 0.089*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 
 (9.52) (4.45) (7.57) (2.59) (7.47) (5.73) 
Princelings*SOE  -0.066***  -0.047***  -0.004 
  (-3.55)  (-4.18)  (-0.49) 
SOE  0.030***  0.018***  0.010*** 
  (5.95)  (6.18)  (4.03) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (5.23) (5.65) (5.84) (6.25) (3.82) (4.21) 
ROSt-1 0.185*** 0.189*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
 (6.16) (6.49) (10.27) (10.62) (9.07) (9.28) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (6.40) (6.22) (6.27) (6.09) (10.69) (10.55) 
Size 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 
 (4.80) (3.32) (7.28) (6.35) (9.36) (7.76) 
Tangibility 0.221*** 0.226*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 
 (5.20) (5.53) (4.35) (4.68) (10.24) (10.55) 
Board 0.018** 0.017* 0.008* 0.007 0.008 0.007* 
 (2.11) (1.70) (1.87) (1.46) (1.29) (1.91) 
Independence 0.057 0.058 0.023 0.024 0.029 0.029 
 (0.43) (0.47) (0.16) (0.22) (1.01) (0.99) 
Constant -4.640*** -4.691*** -2.266*** -2.297*** -2.052*** -2.073*** 
 (-9.83) (-9.07) (-7.29) (-7.87) (-8.48) (-8.64) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.474 0.412 0.413 0.426 0.427 
Observations 16,976 16,976 16,976 16,976 17,034 17,034 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on the accessibility of total 
bank loans in column 1 and 2, on the accessibility of long-term loans in column 3 and 
4, on the accessibility of short-term loans in column 5 and 6. The key independent 
variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princelings connections of listed 
firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; SOE is a dummy which equals 
1 for SOEs and 0 for non-SOEs; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal 
political connections of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are 
reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, 
** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 4. The impact of princelings connections on bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.085*** 0.122*** 0.029*** 
 (8.92) (6.95) (4.87) 
Princelings -0.084** -0.234*** -0.025** 
*ROS t-1 (-2.07) (-2.79) (-1.98) 
ROS t-1 0.192*** 0.359*** 0.059*** 
 (6.12) (4.86) (8.66) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.021** 0.004 
 (5.23) (2.39) (1.37) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.007*** 
 (6.44) (9.53) (6.94) 
Size 0.216*** 0.288*** 0.101*** 
 (4.83) (4.57) (9.66) 
Tangibility 0.220*** 0.323*** 0.066*** 
 (5.15) (3.37) (6.56) 
Board 0.018*** 0.021** 0.003** 
 (9.14) (2.17) (2.07) 
Independence 0.058* 0.055 0.015 
 (1.65) (0.88) (0.98) 
Constant -4.641*** -6.133*** -2.130*** 
 (-9.85) (-7.05) (-5.29) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Chow test  4.73**  
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.530 0.397 
Observations 16,976 8,263 8,713 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on bank lending decisions in 
all listed firms, as well as SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. The dependent variable is 
total bank loan. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures 
the princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-
backed; ROS is return on sales that represent firm profitability; Normal PC is a 
dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. 
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Table 5. The impact of princelings connections on investment decisions 
VARIABLES Investment growth 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.137** 0.006 0.253** 
 (2.09) (0.06) (2.48) 
Princelings -0.094*** -0.025 -0.145*** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-3.33) (-0.52) (-3.89) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.027** 0.029*** 
 (3.59) (2.07) (2.84) 
Normal PC -0.012 -0.018 -0.022 
 (-0.57) (-0.58) (-0.73) 
Leverage t-1 -0.193*** -0.109 -0.209*** 
 (-3.87) (-1.46) (-2.95) 
Size 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 
 (5.17) (4.08) (3.90) 
Tangibility 0.761*** 0.640*** 0.892*** 
 (11.67) (7.69) (8.45) 
Constant -0.797*** -0.934*** -1.164*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.28) (-3.11) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Chow test  6.03**  
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.236 0.456 
Observations 13,019 6,354 6,665 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on investment growth in all 
listed firms, as well as SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. The dependent variable is 
investment growth measured by Ln(It/It-1). The key independent variable Princelings 
is a dummy that measures the princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 
if the firm is princeling-backed; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value 
divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment opportunities; 
Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; 
detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 6. The influence of the anti-corruption campaign on princelings connections 
regarding bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 Princelings            Non-princelings Princelings             Non-princelings 
Campaign 0.127 0.089*** 0.022 0.034*** 
 (1.16) (4.58) (0.73) (4.06) 
Campaign  0.125** 0.012 0.085*** 0.016 
*ROSit-1 (2.30) (0.20) (3.07) (0.96) 
ROS it-1 0.364*** 0.336*** 0.081*** 0.054*** 
 (3.77) (12.94) (3.44) (7.21) 
Normal PC -0.000 0.023*** 0.001 0.005* 
 (-0.00) (2.64) (0.08) (1.69) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.087*** 0.030*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 
 (5.09) (8.34) (3.45) (6.57) 
Size 0.419*** 0.278*** 0.130*** 0.099*** 
 (22.74) (70.68) (17.99) (56.93) 
Tangibility 0.173 0.332*** 0.085** 0.065*** 
 (1.54) (13.51) (2.10) (6.28) 
Board -0.016 0.023*** 0.001 0.002* 
 (-0.88) (6.61) (0.21) (1.67) 
Independence 0.022 0.060*** -0.002 0.013*** 
 (0.45) (6.41) (-0.10) (3.47) 
Constant -8.707*** -5.915*** -2.725*** -2.086*** 
 (-3.02) (-6.26) (-8.01) (-5.47) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.713 0.519 0.583 0.389 
Observations 441 7,822 494 8,219 
 
This table shows the influence of the anti-corruption campaign on princelings 
connections regarding bank lending decisions in SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. 
Column 1 and 3 report the results in princeling-backed firms, while column 2 and 4 
report the results in non-princeling-backed firms. The dependent variable is total bank 
loan. The key independent variable Campaign is a dummy that equals 1 when it refers 
to years later than 2012; ROS is return on sales that represent firm profitability; 
Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; 
detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 7. The influence of the anti-corruption campaign on princelings connections 
regarding corporate investment decisions 
VARIABLES Investment Growth 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 Princelings            Non-princelings Princelings             Non-princelings 
Campaign 0.093 0.197*** 0.384 0.043 
 (0.28) (2.66) (0.88) (0.46) 
Campaign  0.137* 0.030 0.002** 0.015 
* Tobin’s Qt-1 (1.84) (1.16) (2.02) (0.90) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.006 0.033** 0.247*** 0.034*** 
 (0.10) (2.33) (4.21) (2.69) 
Normal PC -0.037 -0.015 0.013 -0.022 
 (-0.26) (-0.50) (0.09) (-0.71) 
Leverage t-1 -0.155 -0.113 -0.282 -0.206*** 
 (-0.42) (-1.47) (-0.91) (-2.82) 
Size 0.043 0.049*** 0.201** 0.061*** 
 (0.77) (3.81) (2.49) (3.53) 
Tangibility 1.361*** 0.607*** 0.274 0.954*** 
 (3.66) (7.07) (0.56) (8.80) 
Constant -0.014 -0.935*** -5.031*** -1.022*** 
 (-0.01) (-3.18) (-2.90) (-2.66) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1875 0.2324 0. 2910 0.4308 
Observations 441 7,822 494 8,219 
 
This table shows the influence of the anti-corruption campaign on princelings 
connections regarding corporate investment decisions in SOEs and non-SOEs 
respectively. Column 1 and 3 report the results in princeling-backed firms, while 
column 2 and 4 report the results in non-princeling-backed firms. The dependent 
variable is investment growth. The key independent variable Campaign is a dummy 
that equals 1 when it refers to years later than 2012; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the 
market assets value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment 
opportunities; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections 
of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 8. The comparison between princelings shareholders and executives, regarding 
the impact of princelings connections on total bank loan 
VARIABLES  Total bank loan  






Princelings 0.040*** 0.354*** 0.053*** 0.326*** 0.021*** 0.201*** 
 (4.04) (14.48) (2.68) (9.84) (3.57) (6.72) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.005* 0.003 
 (5.34) (5.14) (2.79) (2.21) (1.86) (1.13) 
ROSt-1 0.177*** 0.188*** 0.327*** 0.351*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
 (15.92) (15.62) (14.33) (14.39) (9.18) (8.53) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (15.59) (15.30) (8.89) (8.63) (7.02) (6.39) 
Size 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.276*** 0.286*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 (92.60) (90.82) (72.09) (71.64) (59.42) (56.94) 
Tangibility 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.323*** 0.336*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 
 (15.66) (15.02) (13.65) (13.39) (6.89) (5.88) 
Board 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.002 0.003** 
 (9.54) (9.47) (6.71) (6.32) (1.59) (2.26) 
Independence 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 
 (10.73) (10.77) (6.39) (6.10) (3.12) (4.28) 
Constant -4.444*** -4.607*** -5.877*** -6.089*** -2.103*** -2.099*** 
 (-9.55) (-8.82) (-6.61) (-6.19) (-5.92) (-5.50) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.479 0.518 0.534 0.394 0.395 
Observations 16,836 16,178 8,141 7,941 8,695 8,237 
 
This table shows the impact of different types of princelings connections on the 
accessibility of total bank loans. The results of princelings shareholders are reported 
in column 1, 3 and 5.The results of princelings executives are reported in column 2, 4 
and 6. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the 
princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princelings 
connected; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of 
listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 9. The comparison between princelings shareholders and executives, regarding 
the impact of princelings connections on bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES  Total bank loan  






Princelings 0.038*** 0.343*** 0.049** 0.302*** 0.022*** 0.440*** 
 (3.78) (11.99) (2.48) (7.85) (3.69) (9.88) 
Princelings -0.049 -0.139* -0.142 -0.296** -0.022 -3.330*** 
*ROSt-1 (-1.22) (-1.75) (-1.63) (-2.24) (-0.96) (-7.22) 
ROSt-1 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.336*** 0.354*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 (5.67) (5.64) (4.29) (4.44) (8.56) (8.42) 
Normal PC 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020** 0.005* 0.004 
 (5.33) (5.15) (2.79) (2.23) (1.85) (1.37) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (15.62) (15.28) (8.94) (8.58) (6.99) (6.45) 
Size 0.208*** 0.215*** 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 (92.61) (90.81) (72.12) (71.62) (59.38) (56.93) 
Tangibility 0.221*** 0.227*** 0.323*** 0.335*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 
 (15.63) (15.00) (13.64) (13.38) (6.91) (6.05) 
Board 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.002 0.003** 
 (9.55) (9.48) (6.67) (6.32) (1.56) (1.96) 
Independence 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 
 (10.74) (10.77) (6.36) (6.09) (3.09) (4.05) 
Constant -4.445*** -4.607*** -5.880*** -6.087*** -2.103*** -2.094*** 
 (-9.56) (-8.80) (-6.63) (-6.15) (-5.89) (-5.54) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.479 0.518 0.534 0.394 0.399 
Observations 16,836 16,178 8,141 7,941 8,695 8,237 
 
This table shows the impact of different types of princelings connections on bank 
lending decisions. The results of princelings shareholders are reported in column 1, 3 
and 5.The results of princelings executives are reported in column 2, 4 and 6. The key 
independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princelings 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princelings connected; ROS is 
return on sales that represent firm profitability; Normal PC is a dummy that measures 
the normal political connections of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables 
are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 10. The comparison between princelings shareholders and executives, regarding 
the impact of princelings connections on investment decisions 
VARIABLES  Investment growth  






Princelings 0.099 0.134* -0.058 0.032 0.452 0.241** 
 (0.67) (1.79) (-0.38) (0.30) (0.93) (2.25) 
Princelings -0.043 -0.094*** 0.007 -0.038 -0.367 -0.139*** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-0.46) (-3.05) (0.07) (-0.66) (-1.15) (-3.54) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027** 0.026** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
 (3.61) (3.45) (2.09) (2.04) (2.86) (2.68) 
Normal PC -0.012 -0.010 -0.019 -0.014 -0.022 -0.022 
 (-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.61) (-0.45) (-0.75) (-0.71) 
Leverage t-1 -0.190*** -0.195*** -0.105 -0.116 -0.207*** -0.205*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.83) (-1.39) (-1.53) (-2.92) (-2.82) 
Size 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 
 (5.10) (4.81) (3.99) (4.01) (3.90) (3.52) 
Tangibility 0.756*** 0.765*** 0.632*** 0.614*** 0.895*** 0.953*** 
 (-11.51) (11.48) (7.52) (7.23) (8.46) (8.80) 
Constant -0.808*** -0.738*** -0.949*** -0.956*** -1.168*** -1.012*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.33) (-3.26) (-3.31) (-3.11) (-2.63) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.3210 0.3132 0.2316 0.2334 0.4528 0.4307 
Observations 12,903 12,486 6,253 6,140 6,650 6,346 
 
This table shows the impact of different types of princelings connections on bank 
lending decisions. The results of princelings shareholders are reported in column 1, 3 
and 5.The results of princelings executives are reported in column 2, 4 and 6. The key 
independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princelings 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princelings connected; 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value divided by the replacement cost of 
assets, representing investment opportunities; Normal PC is a dummy that measures 
the normal political connections of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables 
are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. 
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Table 11. The impact of princelings connections in firms with or without normal 
political connections (NPC) regarding bank lending decisions 
VARIABLES Total bank loan 
  SOEs Non-SOEs 
  With PC         Without PC With PC         Without PC 
Princelings 0.162*** 0.111*** 0.040*** 0.025*** 
 (4.40) (5.53) (2.96) (4.33) 
Princelings 0.044 -0.268*** -0.069 -0.015* 
*ROS t-1 (0.27) (-2.72) (-1.07) (-1.72) 
ROS t-1 0.330*** 0.357*** 0.054** 0.053*** 
 (7.60) (12.27) (2.56) (8.66) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.019*** 0.037*** 0.002 0.006*** 
 (2.83) (9.03) (0.72) (6.40) 
Size 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.125*** 0.084*** 
 (3.38) (3.71) (3.39) (4.86) 
Tangibility 0.206*** 0.365** 0.091*** 0.051*** 
 (4.79) (2.41) (3.88) (5.19) 
Board 0.027*** 0.017** 0.006** 0.007** 
 (4.63) (2.21) (2.27) (2.32) 
Independence 0.057 0.053* 0.003 0.020 
 (0.51) (1.82) (0.44) (1.17) 
Constant -5.777*** -6.229*** -2.695*** -1.751*** 
 (-3.78) (-6.79) (-3.94) (-4.82) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.527 0.535 0.441 0.371 
Observations 2,271 5,992 2,756 5,957 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on bank lending decisions in 
SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. Column 1 and 3 report the results in firms with 
normal political connections, while column 2 and 4 report the results in firms without 
normal political connections. The dependent variable is total bank loan. The key 
independent variable Princelings is a dummy that measures the princelings 
connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; ROS is 
return on sales that represent firm profitability; detailed definitions of all the variables 
are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 12. The impact of princelings connections in firms with or without normal 
political connections (PC) regarding corporate investment decisions 
VARIABLES Investment Growth 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
 With PC         Without PC With PC         Without PC 
Princelings 0.021 -0.005 -0.208 0.303** 
 (0.12) (-0.05) (-1.09) (2.42) 
Princelings -0.077 -0.006 -0.141* -0.152*** 
* Tobin’s Q t-1 (-0.75) (-0.11) (-1.71) (-3.56) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.033 0.024 0.041** 0.025** 
 (1.21) (1.59) (2.37) (1.96) 
Leverage t-1 -0.031 -0.134 -0.194 -0.208** 
 (-0.18) (-1.60) (-1.41) (-2.47) 
Size 0.057** 0.046*** 0.065** 0.071*** 
 (2.25) (3.23) (2.49) (3.14) 
Tangibility 0.662*** 0.635*** 1.107*** 0.791*** 
 (4.06) (6.44) (6.30) (5.93) 
Constant -1.210** -0.802** -1.124* -1.277** 
 (-2.14) (-2.38) (-1.96) (-2.55) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.233 0.566 0.411 
Observations 1,712 4,642 2,210 4,455 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on corporate investment 
decisions in SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. Column 1 and 3 report the results in 
firms with normal political connections, while column 2 and 4 report the results in 
firms without normal political connections. The dependent variable is investment 
growth measured by Ln(It/It-1). The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy 
that measures the princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princeling-backed; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market assets value divided by the 
replacement cost of assets, representing investment opportunities; detailed definitions 
of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets 
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Table 13. Difference in difference regression results  
Panel A. Difference in difference regression results of the impacts of princelings 
connections on the level of access to bank loans 
VARIABLES Total bank loans 
 All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.031*** 
 (6.43) (2.66) (3.54) 
Princelings -0.201** -0.120* -0.157*** 
*Campaign (-2.23) (-1.96) (-3.14) 
Campaign -0.060* -0.149*** -0.042*** 
 (-1.81) (-6.49) (-4.03) 
Normal PC -0.011 0.024** 0.007* 
 (-0.74) (2.18) (1.73) 
Tobin’s Q 0.004 0.070*** 0.015*** 
 (0.77) (3.70) (9.51) 
Size 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.109*** 
 (4.54) (6.53) (4.56) 
Tangibility 0.263*** 0.393*** 0.096*** 
 (6.40) (3.30) (7.37) 
Board 0.010* 0.019* 0.003* 
 (1.71) (1.68) (1.67) 
Independence 0.010 0.064 0.011** 
 (0.63) (1.63) (2.20) 
Constant -5.453*** -6.568*** -2.297*** 
 (-3.92) (-6.52) (-3.55) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Chow test  4.01**  
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.571 0.427 
Observations 16,976 8,263 8,713 
 
This table shows the difference in difference random effect model regression results 
of the impacts of princelings connections on the level of access to bank loans in SOEs 
and non-SOEs respectively. Column 1 reports the results in all sample firms, while 
columns 2 and 3 report the results in SOEs and non-SOEs. The dependent variable is 
total bank loans. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the firm is princelings connected; Campaign is a dummy that equals 1 
when it refers to years later than 2012; detailed definitions of all the variables are 
reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, 
** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Panel B. Difference in difference regression results of the impacts of princelings 
connections on investment growth 
VARIABLES Investment growth 
 All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings -0.086 -0.031 -0.028 
 (-0.48) (-0.43) (-0.29) 
Princelings -0.167** -0.061* -0.119** 
*Campaign (-2.28) (-1.68) (-2.36) 
Campaign -0.252 0.065 -0.189*** 
 (-0.85) (0.69) (-2.94) 
Normal PC 0.040 -0.024 -0.043 
 (0.56) (-0.73) (-1.14) 
Leverage -0.044 -0.004 -0.168* 
 (-0.31) (-0.05) (-1.69) 
Size 0.066** 0.037*** 0.054** 
 (2.23) (2.81) (2.50) 
Tangibility 0.491** 0.717*** 0.893*** 
 (2.36) (7.96) (6.81) 
Constant -1.223* -0.698** -0.904** 
 (-1.67) (-2.36) (-1.96) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Chow test  3.90**  
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.221 0.354 
Observations 13,019 6,354 6,665 
 
This table shows the difference in difference random effect model regression results 
of the impacts of princelings connections on investment growth in SOEs and non-
SOEs respectively. Column 1 report the results in all sample firms, while columns 2 
and 3 report the results in SOEs and non-SOEs. The key independent variable 
Princelings is a dummy that measures the princelings connections of listed firms, 
which equals 1 if the firm is princelings connected; Campaign is a dummy that equals 
1 when it refers to years later than 2012; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the 
normal political connections of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are 
reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, 
** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 14. Robustness tests with different dependent variables 
Panel A. The impact of princelings connections on changes in bank loan 
VARIABLES ∆ total bank loan ∆ long-term bank loan ∆ short-term bank loan 
Princelings 0.710*** 1.354*** 0.000 0.004 0.706*** 1.352*** 
 (3.23) (4.44) (0.18) (1.41) (3.24) (4.46) 
Princelings  -1.337***  -0.008*  -1.338*** 
*SOE  (-3.05)  (-1.84)  (-3.07) 
SOE  0.101  0.004***  0.105 
  (0.88)  (3.28)  (0.92) 
Normal PC 0.020 0.021 0.002* 0.002** 0.022 0.023 
 (0.19) (0.20) (1.77) (2.05) (0.20) (0.22) 
ROS t-1 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (3.06) (3.07) (2.30) (2.33) (3.07) (3.08) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.000 0.000 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 (105.41) (105.47) (0.64) (0.74) (105.72) (105.78) 
Size 0.093** 0.095** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.097** 0.101** 
 (2.12) (2.09) (11.89) (12.24) (2.24) (2.23) 
Tangibility 0.054 0.058 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.073 0.078 
 (0.16) (0.18) (6.28) (6.07) (0.22) (0.24) 
Board -0.059 -0.058 -0.000 -0.000 -0.058 -0.058 
 (-1.33) (-1.31) (-0.22) (-0.44) (-1.33) (-1.31) 
Independence 0.039 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.040 0.032 
 (0.32) (0.26) (0.61) (0.58) (0.33) (0.27) 
Constant 2.454** 2.475** 0.100*** 0.106*** 2.548*** 2.577*** 
 (2.57) (2.52) (10.60) (10.97) (2.68) (2.64) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.437 0.437 0.365 0.372 0.437 0.437 
Observations 14,451 14,451 14,451 14,451 14,534 14,534 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on change in total bank loan in 
column 1 and 2, on change in long-term bank loan in column 3 and 4, on change in 
short-term bank loan in column 5 and 6. The key independent variable Princelings is a 
dummy that measures the princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if 
the firm is princeling-backed; SOE is a dummy which equals 1 for SOEs and 0 for 
non-SOEs; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of 
listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Panel B. The impact of princelings connections on bank lending decisions, with 
change in total bank loan to be the dependent variable 
VARIABLES ∆ total bank loan 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.649*** 0.001 1.239*** 
 (2.95) (0.16) (2.90) 
Princelings -0.686*** 0.037 -0.678*** 
*ROS t-1 (-7.07) (1.61) (-4.99) 
ROS t-1 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 (4.07) (3.29) (5.65) 
Normal PC 0.023 -0.000 0.024 
 (0.21) (-0.12) (0.12) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.195*** 0.005*** 0.196*** 
 (105.82) (5.39) (75.37) 
Size 0.087** 0.011*** -0.075 
 (2.00) (9.33) (-0.74) 
Tangibility 0.086 0.030*** 0.510 
 (0.26) (3.95) (0.72) 
Board -0.058 0.003*** -0.128 
 (-1.31) (2.67) (-1.40) 
Independence 0.028 -0.005 -0.023 
 (0.23) (-1.62) (-0.09) 
Constant 2.351** -0.208*** 2.602 
 (2.46) (-8.29) (1.17) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.439 0.425 0.440 
Observations 14,451 7,031 7,420 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on bank lending decisions in 
all listed firms, as well as SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. The dependent variable is 
change in total bank loan. The key independent variable Princelings is a dummy that 
measures the princelings connections of listed firms, which equals 1 if the firm is 
princeling-backed; ROS is return on sales that represent firm profitability; Normal PC 
is a dummy that measures the normal political connections of listed firms; detailed 
definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. 
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Panel C. The impact of princelings connections on investment decisions, with change 
in investment expenditure to be the dependent variable 
VARIABLES ∆investment expenditure 
All sample firms SOEs Non-SOEs 
Princelings 0.001 0.007 0.001 
 (0.08) (0.49) (0.04) 
Princelings -0.001** -0.005 -0.001** 
*Tobin’s Q t-1 (-2.17) (-1.06) (-2.36) 
Tobin’s Q t-1 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001* 
 (2.86) (5.25) (1.76) 
Normal PC -0.001 -0.001 0.004 
 (-0.11) (-0.13) (0.36) 
Leverage t-1 -0.027*** -0.002 -0.026*** 
 (-32.52) (-0.23) (-25.39) 
Size 0.004* 0.006** 0.015*** 
 (1.77) (2.54) (2.95) 
Tangibility 0.044** -0.021 0.074** 
 (2.34) (-1.35) (2.00) 
Constant 0.113** -0.123** 0.345*** 
 (2.09) (-2.41) (3.04) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.362 0.645 
Observations 13,019 6,354 6,665 
 
This table shows the impact of princelings connections on change in investment 
expenditures in all listed firms, as well as SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. The 
dependent variable is change in investment expenditure. The key independent variable 
Princelings is a dummy that measures the princelings connections of listed firms, 
which equals 1 if the firm is princeling-backed; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market 
assets value divided by the replacement cost of assets, representing investment 
opportunities; Normal PC is a dummy that measures the normal political connections 
of listed firms; detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Appendix A. T-
statistics are reported in brackets below the coefficients. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Appendix A. Definition and calculation of variables 
 
Name of variables Definition 
Panel A. Dependent variables  
Bank loan  Includes total bank loan, long-term bank loan and short-term 
bank loan 
Total bank loan Total bank loans scaled by total assets 
Long-term bank loan Long-term bank loans scaled by total assets 
Short-term bank loan Short-term bank loans scaled by total assets 
Investment growth Logarithm of investment expenditure divided by its one period 
lag 
∆ total bank loan Total bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets 
∆long-term bank loan Long-term bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total assets 
∆ short-term bank loan Short-term bank loans less its one period lag scaled by total 
assets 
∆investment expenditure Investment expenditure less its one period lag scaled by total 
assets 
Panel B. Independent variables  
Princelings A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a princeling 
shareholder or executive 
SOE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a SOE, and equals 0 
if the firm is a non-SOE 
Normal PC A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has an executive with 
governmental working experience 
Campaign A dummy variable that equals 1 if referring to the period after the 
anti-corruption campaign 
ROS Total pre-tax profits to total sales 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets 
Panel C. Control variables  
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Tangibility  Total fixed assets to total assets 
Leverage Total liabilities to total assets 
Board  Number of directors on the board to total assets 
Independence Number of independent directors on the board to total number of 
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